This episode challenges the common belief that following diving standards automatically makes diving safe. It explores how industry standards, while important, can create an illusion of safety when compliance becomes the main goal rather than improving real-world performance. The discussion examines how many diving standards are written and assessed by the same organisations they are meant to guide, creating a closed system that can protect institutions legally while limiting opportunities for deeper learning and improvement. It also looks at why accident investigations often focus on individual mistakes rather than questioning whether the procedures, training, or standards themselves are fit for purpose. Drawing on research from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the episode argues that safer diving requires more than rule-following—it needs independent oversight, greater transparency, and a willingness to learn from outside safety science. True progress comes not from assuming yesterday’s standards are enough, but from building systems that can recognise their own limits and continually improve.
Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floor
Links: Diving Talks: 'Compliance provides an illusion for safety in diving
InDepth article: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/
Suggested further reading
Amalberti, R. (2001) The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety Science, 37(2–3), pp. 109–126.https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092575350000045X
Carpenter, D. and Moss, D. (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture (Cambridge University Press, 2014).https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/preventing-regulatory-capture/
Dekker, S., The Safety Anarchist (Routledge, 2018) and Compliance Capitalism (Routledge, 2022).https://www.amazon.co.uk/Safety-Anarchist-innovation-bureaucracy-compliance-ebook/dp/B0FCCZCTG5
Dixon-Woods, M., Yeung, K., & Bosk, C. L. (2011). Why is UK medicine no longer a self-regulating profession? The role of scandals involving “bad apple” doctors. Social Science & Medicine, 73(10), 1452–1459.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.08.031
Hopkins, A., Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster (CCH Australia, 2008).https://www.amazon.co.uk/Failure-Learn-Texas-Refinery-Disaster/dp/1921322446
Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., and Hollnagel, E., What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find: The consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals, Safety Science 47(10), 2009.https://www-sciencedirect-com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/science/article/pii/S0925753509000137
Meyer, J. and Rowan, B., Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology 83(2), 1977.https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2778293.pdf
Rae, A., Provan, D., Weber, D., and Dekker, S., Safety Clutter: The Accumulation and Persistence of 'Safety' Work That Does Not Contribute to Operational Safety, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 16(2), 2018.https://doi.10.1080/14773996.2018.1491147
Thompson, D., Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands, American Political Science Review 74(4), 1980.
Tags: THD-English|THD-Operations & Procedures
