This episode explores the growing recognition that safe and effective scientific diving depends on more than technical skill, equipment, and certification. Prompted by new research into applying Crew Resource Management (CRM) to scientific diver training, it examines why communication, leadership, teamwork, and decision-making are essential in complex underwater operations where divers must manage both life support and scientific tasks under pressure. Drawing on lessons from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the discussion highlights key challenges such as cognitive overload, distributed situational awareness, and authority gradients that can prevent divers from speaking up or adapting effectively when conditions change. It also reviews the existing research, training tools, and practical frameworks already available to support this shift, while recognising that long-term improvement depends on treating diving safety as an ongoing process of learning rather than a box-ticking exercise. The message is clear: true safety is built through the conditions teams create, the culture they sustain, and how they respond when concerns are raised—always striving to be better than yesterday.
Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/CRM-and-Scientific-Diving
Links: Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/raymond-arce-528304355_cd37166-scientificdiving-divertraining-share-7460336156979888128-ASrc/?utm_source=social_share_send&utm_medium=member_desktop_web&rcm=ACoAAAELqPcBwf1_VKIPpplosn5XZ02d6xlOzRs
9th Annual European Conference on Scientific Diving: https://ecsd9azores.com/
Resilient Performance Model blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-model
Outcomes are a Function of…..: https://youtu.be/nkdVHBDnCjc?t=2293
Looking at CRM relevant failures: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteot
Guide to Diving Crew Resource Management: https://www.thehumandiver.com/commercial-occupational-diving
Moving beyond the position that compliance means safety: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/
References
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CSA Group (2026). CSA Z275.2: Occupational Health and Safety Code for Diving Operations. Toronto: CSA Group.
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Flin, R., O'Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to Non-Technical Skills. Farnham: Ashgate.
Health and Safety Executive (2011). Research Report RR871: Assessment of Manual Operations and Emergency Procedures for Closed Circuit Rebreathers. London: HSE Books.
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2018). Report 503: Introducing Behavioural Markers of Non-Technical Skills in Oil and Gas Operations. London: IOGP.
Lock, G. (2019). Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors. Milton Keynes: Human in the System Consulting.
Lock, G. (2023). Human factors and rebreather diving. In: Pollock NW, ed. Rebreather Forum 4. Proceedings of the April 20-22, 2023 workshop. Valletta, Malta; 2024. p. 57–69.
O'Brien, E., & Caramanna, G. (2017). Human factors in scientific diving: an experimental approach. In Proceedings of the AAUS Diving for Science Symposium 2017. Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary: American Academy of Underwater Sciences.
Piispanen, W., Lundell, R., Tuominen, L., & Räisänen-Sokolowski, A. (2021). Assessment of alertness and cognitive performance of closed circuit rebreather divers with the Critical Flicker Fusion Frequency Test in Arctic diving conditions. Frontiers in Physiology, 12, 722915.
Reader, T. W., & O'Connor, P. (2014). The Deepwater Horizon explosion: non-technical skills, safety culture, and system complexity. Journal of Risk Research, 17(3), 405–424.
Reitz, M., Nilsson, V., Day, E. and Higgins, J. (2019).Speaking truth to power at work. Hult Research.
Sinek, S. (2019). The Infinite Game. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.
Stanton, N. A., Stewart, R., Harris, D., Houghton, R. J., Baber, C., McMaster, R., Salmon, P., Hoyle, G., Walker, G., Young, M. S., Linsell, M., Dymott, R., & Green, D. (2006). Distributed situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development and application of an ergonomics methodology. Ergonomics, 49(12–13), 1288–1311.
Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: effects on learning. Cognitive Science, 12(2), 257–285.
Yule, S., Flin, R., Paterson-Brown, S., & Maran, N. (2006). Development of a rating system for surgeons' non-technical skills. Medical Education, 40(11), 1098–1104.
Tags: THD-English|THD-CRM, Leadership & Teamwork
