On "An Argument for the Identity Theory" (1966), which unlike U.T. Place who merely argued that minds could be brains, argues that minds must be brains, in all possible worlds.

The argument appears functionalist: mental states are defined by their causal roles, and causality is naturally the realm of the physical, so mental causality makes most sense if it is a way of talking about physical causality.

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