The BEST EVER Cumulative Case for God

Here I argue that God exists. In the next two parts, I'll argue for Catholic miracles, criticize non-Catholic explanations of the miraculous data, and respond to objections to Catholicism.

Here I argue that God exists. In the next two parts, I'll argue for Catholic miracles, criticize non-Catholic explanations of the miraculous data, and respond to objections to Catholicism.Like the show? Help it grow! Consider becoming a patron (thanks!): https://www.patreon.com/majestyofreasonIf you wanna make a one-time donation or tip (thanks!): https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/josephcschmidRESOURCE DOCUMENT: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1qrECmtjhrnqJYtiOxOihJlCrNCPN_YDJ7hLIp-0U4Kg/edit?usp=sharing

CORRECTIONS AND ADDENDA

(1) I should have noted, when giving Pruss and Rasmussen's contingency argument in Part 3, that while I was very highly confident in this argument at the time, I'm less confident in it now. My main source of uncertainty nowadays is the second premise, as there might conceivably be an explanation of contingent things which both (i) doesn't invoke contingent things (and so is non-circular), but (ii) also doesn't invoke a necessary thing, because it's a non-entitative explanation (i.e., an explanation that doesn't cite the activity of any concrete things). Still, I think there are reasons to prefer an entitative to a non-entitative explanation here (e.g., the latter is strongly inductively disconfirmed). So, while Pruss and Rasmussen don't do the following in their formulation of the argument, I would either modify the explanatory principle to reference not just explanations but *entitative* explanations, or else modify the consequent of the second premise to 'probably some necessary thing exists'.