This podcast episode is the first of a three-part series on the reliability of the media regarding conspiracy theories. This episode is based on material taken from an article entitled, “Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic?” published in the journal Episteme in 2020, by Kurtis Hagen, which is a response to an article by philosopher Keith Harris. While discussion of the media’s reliability is tangential to the main argument of the article, it was included there in order to address the concerns of a reviewer who seemed to share Harris’s optimistic view.
Is Conspiracy Theorizing Really Epistemically Problematic? (Episteme 2020)
ABSTRACT: In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: (1) It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. (2) It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And, (3) it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information sources. In response, I have argued that, like other generalist critiques of conspiracy theories, the arguments offered by Harris do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence.
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