As the news of Russian mobilisation and Germany's Kriegsgefahr spread across Europe, urgent telegrams followed.
Whether in London, Berlin, or Paris, the picture was becoming clearer, but that did not mean contemporaries were content to allow the march to war. The Tsar had burned his bridges in Berlin, as the disgusted Germans scoffed at his decision to mobilise while requesting their mediation. Could he not understand that it was a provocation to prepare his entire army on their borders? Could Britain not see that Austria could give no concessions, and that this would not have made a difference anyway? Could the French not appreciate that necessity demanded she be neutralised first?
It was not cold hearted aggression or a lust for world conquest that spurred the German government forward, but the immediate threat to her security, and the worrying sign that no powers outside of her immediate alliance appeared to be listening to her anymore. Although Berlin had been honest about her intentions since Russia's step was learned of, still, somehow, the impression had set in that Germany was to blame. Grey had not given up hope, but his underlings were not enthusiastic about the prospects. In Berlin, apprehension had given way to a sense of relief. Russian mobilisation was official - surely this removed all questions of who was at fault? They had not sought the war, but if it was to be fought, these were the best possible circumstances. With a stirring sense of justice on their side, the German peacemakers took a step back, as the crisis entered its final phase.
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