As Belgrade burned with rage following the death of Ambassador Hartwig, Berchtold was on the verge of his greatest triumph.
After several intense weeks of pressure, Stefan Tisza seemed finally to be seeing the light. A combination of factors, including German pressure, agitation from his subordinates, fear of Romania, outrage at Serbia, and probably exhaustion, all moved Tisza to accept a policy of war. Tisza was eager to clarify that this did not render him a hawk - he still wished for peace if this was possible. Yet, he no longer blocked the construction of an ultimatum designed to be impossible for Serbia to accept, and he no longer flew the lonely flag for diplomacy. How had Tisza been persuaded, and what did it mean for Berchtold, to finally have a united Cabinet behind him? Here we consider these critical questions, in a pivotal turning point of the July Crisis.
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